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Abstract 
 
This research investigates the role of social capital and government intervention in explaining the 
differences of innovation output and economic growth for regions of the European Union from 1990-
2002. Using several measures of social capital and innovation, and the European Union’s Objective 1, 
2 and 5b figures for EU regional support, the estimates suggest that EU funding is not significantly 
contributing to economic outcomes, while social capital is. Investigation of a possible complementary 
relationship between social capital and government support reveals that regions with higher levels of 
social capital are more likely to effectively gain from EU regional support programmes. This result 
implies that aside from the benefits associated with the direct effect of social capital on economic 
outcomes, social capital appears to be a critical prerequisite for the effective implementation of 
government programmes. From a policy perspective, it appears to be important to stimulate education 
to foster human capital formation. When combined, human capital and social capital are likely to yield 
stronger effects for effective policies which increase economic outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do social capital and government support programmes, such as the European Union’s 
Objective 1, 2 and 5b regional support programmes, have a positive impact on regional economic 
outcomes? The empirical results presented in this study suggest that European Union (EU) funding 
does not provide a significant contribution to the welfare of EU regions unless it is integrated with 
social capital. Why is this? Our research indicates that there is a positive interrelationship between 
levels of education, measures of social capital, and effectiveness of government support programmes.  
As such, for any given level of economic development, regions with on average higher levels of 
education and greater social capital are more likely to be characterised by stronger networks where 
communication, bonds, norms and values, and ultimately production, are more effectively integrated 
and conducted.  This improved structure facilitates a simpler and more effective implementation of 
policy which fosters economic development and boosts innovation. 
More specifically, our estimates and measures suggest that several forms of social capital 
contribute positively to economic growth and innovation. Our results indicate that EU funding has 
no direct effect on economic outcomes, further supporting previous studies which emphasized the 
failure of EU funding to foster development in relatively backward regions. The main contribution 
of the empirical analysis is that a complementary relationship between government spending and 
social capital exists and as such contributes to economic development. Estimates suggest that the 
interaction between social capital and EU funding contributes positively and significantly to 
economic growth and innovation, which in turn implies that given a current level of development, 
regions with relatively higher levels of social capital benefit more from EU support programmes. 
One major problem that comes to the surface when studying the causal link between economic 
outcome and social capital is related to the difficulties experienced when trying to infer causation 
from correlations in the data. For example, a correlation between social capital and funding might 
arise if the funding promoted social capital, if groups with more social capital were able to attract 
more funding, or if an outside factor influenced both funding and social capital. An instrumental 
variable approach was used to estimate the causal effects of social capital on both economic growth 
and innovation, the results of which support strong and robust estimates. 
From a theoretical point of view, the results described in this chapter support the concept that 
institutions are important for both growth and innovation and that this remains true when explaining 
differentials between relatively homogeneous regions of the EU-12 countries. While these regions 
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appear to have the same institutional rules and laws and as such, would be expected to perform 
similarly ceteris paribus, the research indicates that informal institutions such as trust are able to make 
institutions work more effectively in some regions than others. For example, social capital is able to 
reduce information frictions in investment decisions, which makes the financing of risky projects 
more transparent. Italy is a case in point, where differences associated with the social structure vary 
from one region to another and as such, perform very differently in terms of economic growth and 
innovation.  
Our estimates are interesting when referring to policy analysis. The correlation between social 
capital and education suggest that increasing investments in human capital not only exerts a direct 
impact on economic growth and innovation inputs, but also an indirect effect which increases levels 
of trust within societies. It is also important to note that EU programmes have been highly criticised 
for their inability to boost economic growth in relatively backward regions. These estimates suggest 
that the programmes administered as such are indeed not causal to economic growth, but when 
integrated with social capital and education, act as a highly effective means to boost performance. A 
strategy for future funding of relatively backward EU regions might be one that integrates education 
into the funding programme to increase program effectiveness.  Finally, it was noted that innovation 
output is higher in regions where more social capital exists.  In these cases, EU funding helps 
stimulate innovative activities when combined with social capital and education. There appear to be 
two ways in which innovation can be established:  one way is to increase the level of education, 
which is likely to yield multiple effects on economic outcomes; the other way is to design and 
establish economic institutions with sound reputations to stimulate innovation. For example, 
provision for venture capital, tax credits for innovation and other benefit types for investors who 
work in relatively uncertain projects, might be promoted and protected by formal institutions. The 
advantages associated with these types of institutions are manifold stimulating education, innovation, 
the creation of social capital, and ultimately stimulating economic performance and prosperity. 
The following provides a basic outline of the chapter. In Section 2 the theoretical background 
of the study is presented along with a discussion on the previous studies of social capital and 
economic development that were focused on EU funding programme effectiveness.  In Section 3 
several data sets are applied and discussed.  Insight into the most salient details is provided by using a 
number of descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses the main findings associated with 
the estimation of several models.  Finally, in Section 5, policy implications associated with the 
estimates are discussed.  In addition, Italy is used as a case study to illustrate the way in which social 
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capital, education, and government support, develop and act as a reinforcing mechanism that 
increases economic development and innovation. 
 
2. The role of social capital in implementing policies 
 
2.1 Theoretical background  
 
Two important conditions must exist for social capital to influence economic outcomes: the 
first condition states that the decentralised equilibrium is not first best, and the second condition 
states that only a number of cases exist where social capital is able to achieve better outcomes. The 
first condition implies that a role exists for government institutions to establish property rights, 
courts and law, and to promote altruistic behaviour, stronger social bonds, and trust so that 
opportunism is reduced and market transparency is increased.  The second condition indicates that 
social capital is not a term or concept that can be used to explain all of the differences experienced 
between economic performances of different groups.1 In this paper, social capital is defined and 
analysed at the regional level with an understanding that it originates at an individual level due to the 
different forms of social interaction between people. 
The role of social capital to implement government policy can be both positive and negative. 
Social capital is positively correlated with levels of education (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1999) as it 
supports access to publicly provided education and to credit for the poor. This positive correlation is 
important because higher levels of education generally induce denser networks where social capital 
forms. In this situation, social capital generates positive externalities which are in turn generated by 
social interactions. These externalities increase knowledge associated with the behaviour of people, 
which in turn reduces the potential for opportunistic behaviour to take hold.  In addition, and most 
importantly, these externalities are able to withstand the free-rider problem that occurs when 
information is limited resulting in coordination problems and failures. The free-rider problem can be 
reduced by providing public goods and other government initiatives that foster development and 
reduce friction; by creating banking and insurance institutions; and by creating mechanisms to 
penalize disobedient “group members”. In general, regions with on average higher levels of 
education do better in terms of economic performance and as such receive less government support. 
This is certainly true in the case of EU structural funds. That said, it is important to note that given a 
                                                 
1 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) review the literature and argue that social capital may help to resolve coordination 
problems, alter individual incentives or it may affect the technology of social interactions between economic agents. 
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certain level of development, regions with higher levels of social capital are more likely to effectively 
implement support programmes because they are able to internalise the externalities generated by 
social interactions and networks. This implies that a positive correlation between the average level of 
education, the measure of social capital, and the government support programme will exist, which is  
the predicted outcome of  the empirical analysis.  This analysis also predicts that regions with higher 
levels of education will be more likely to devote resources to innovative activities. So, the 
determinants of innovation are likely to be positively correlated to the interaction between social 
capital, education, and government support. 
Research also indicates that social capital has the potential to worsen economic outcomes if 
policy interventions undermine social capital instead of change incentive structures (e.g., Tirole, 
1996).  This is further exemplified in cases where external organizations, such as the Italian Mafia, 
become sources of civil social capital.  In these cases, competition within and between groups 
destroys other forms of social capital, primarily due to the violence used to maintain the 
(information) monopoly (e.g., Gambetta, 1996). The presence of kin groups might also be 
detrimental to economic outcomes. Traditionally these groups have been a valuable resource for 
enforcing bonds but in modern market economies these “dynasties” may be considered an economic 
threat as they might foster corruption (Collier and Garg, 1999). In most European regions these 
forms of detrimental social capital will not occur at a large enough scale and as such, are unlikely to 
influence the implementation and effectiveness of EU programmes.  Reference to the Italian case is 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
 
2.2 Previous empirical research on social capital and economic outcomes 
 
Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993) initiated empirical research on social capital. Coleman 
presented the basic theory of how social capital and social interactions influence behaviour.2 Putnam 
presented an analysis which emphasized the importance of noting the differences in social capital 
when explaining the differences of economic outcomes between the northern and southern regions 
of Italy.  One of the first and most influential empirical studies in this area was conducted by Knack 
and Keefer (1997).  Knack and Keefer estimated how the contribution of measures of social capital 
explained the difference of economic performance between countries. The estimates derived for 29 
countries suggest there is a positive relationship between different measures of social capital, levels 
                                                 
2 Becker and Murphy (2000), Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) provide overview 
studies of both the theoretical and empirical work in this area. 
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of education, and economic performance. They find that more trusting societies not only have a 
stronger incentive to innovate and accumulate physical capital, but also experience higher returns to 
human capital investments.3 
Others have applied this study to European economies including Guiso et al. (2004), Tabellini 
(2005), Moesen et al. (2000), Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005a,b), and Akçomak and ter Weel 
(2006). Guiso et al. (2004) use data associated with blood donations and participation in local 
elections to measure social capital and demonstrate that a positive correlation between these 
measures and the financial development of a large number of Italian municipalities exists.  Tabellini 
(2005) examines the effects culture and institutions have on economic development in EU regions. 
He finds that culture, defined as norms and values created in the past, has a strong impact on current 
institutions and on the current economic performance of EU regions. The next three papers 
investigate the extent to which differences in social capital contribute to differences in regional 
economic growth within regions of the EU.  They find that regions with higher levels of “trust” 
positively correlate to the level of economic growth for the period 1960-2000. Akçomak and ter 
Weel (2006) stress the importance of studying social capital to better understand and explain 
differences in innovation and regional development. A recent study by Fritsch (2004) adds the 
importance of cooperation in R&D processes to make the uncertain process of pursuing innovation 
activities more transparent to investors and capital providers.  
Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriquez-Pose (2004) take a more traditional approach to their study and 
analyse whether those policies that are designed with intent to foster R&D are paying off.  Results 
from their analysis did not support a strong correlation between innovation performance and 
economic growth.  In addition to these findings, Gambardella et al. (2002) observed that patents, 
employment density, and openness affected labour productivity in European regions. That said, it 
should be understood that these studies did not take into account socio-economic variation in terms 
of social capital, which affects capacity to perform R&D. Verspagen (1999) and Rodriguez-Pose 
(1999) investigate the degree to which regional clubs exist and cultivate innovation. Both authors 
find that clubs perform better overall, and that there are economic spillovers to less advanced 
regions. While clubs and social networks share many similarities, they differ in that networks form 
spontaneously as free associations of economic agents, whereas clubs are organised and have a 
                                                 
3 Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) address the robustness of the results of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) 
and present some alternative explanations. Generally, the Zak and Knack’s estimates survive the robustness analysis, but 
Knack and Keefer’s estimates are only limitedly robust. 
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relatively defined membership structure.  That said, clubs have the advantage of making group 
decisions, a possibility social networks of agents do not have. 
 
2.3 EU regional support programmes 
 
In 1962, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was created to 
promote the development of agricultural and rural structures.  In 1975, the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) was established to help alleviate regional disparities in the EU member 
states. In 1986, the European Social Fund (ESF) was developed to improve training, education, and 
employment. Finally, in 1994, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was set up to 
generate productivity and employment growth in the fisheries industry.  These four funds, are 
generally referred to as the “Structural Funds”, and are the funds of interest for this paper.4 It is 
important to note that the main objective of an EU support programme is to act to decrease regional 
disparities in terms of economic cohesion and development. 
The effectiveness of EU policy to foster economic development has been addressed in a 
number of different studies resulting in evidence that is generally mixed. Cappelen et al. (2003) 
present estimates which suggest that regional support has had a positive impact on economic growth 
in the 1990s. Estimates for periods before 1990 appear to be less conclusive. Differing effects of 
regional policy on economic outcomes over a period of time are often attributed to the major reform 
of 1988 which was amplified during the enlargement of the EU by three relatively poor countries 
(i.e., Spain, Portugal and Greece).5 The objective of the reform was to make the funds more effective 
in reducing income inequalities between regions and, as such, more financial resources were made 
available to do so. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) present estimates of the effect structural funds 
had on regional economic performance for the period 1995-2001 and find that poorer countries have 
caught up with richer countries.  These results contrast Boldrin and Canova’s (2001) estimates which 
provide the basis for their argument that structural funds serve re-distributional purposes and as such 
have little relationship to fostering economic growth. These differences in interpretation are most 
likely related to the splitting of data sets into different regions, and the shortage of information for a 
                                                 
4 Other EU funds are the Cohesion Fund created in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the European 
Investment Fund (established in 1994). The aim of the Cohesion Fund is help relatively poor countries to preserve fiscal 
targets. The European Investment Fund aims at the long run financing of projects to the development of small and 
medium-sized firms. 
5 See e.g., Begg and Mayes (1993) for a detailed discussion of the reform and Begg (1997) for a discussion of the policy 
perspective of the structural funds after 1999. Nahuis and de Mooij (2001) argue that there is a new case for reform after 
the recent EU enlargement with former Communist Eastern European countries.  
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number of countries (e.g., Boldrin and Canova, 2001, pp. 241-42). In addition, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Fratesi (2004) found that the effects of structural funds on economic growth are positive but 
temporary, and they observed that investments in education and human capital appear to be the only 
factors that have lasting effects in terms of regional convergence. They conclude from their panel 
estimates that the focus on agriculture seems to be ineffective.  
These studies have not linked the effectiveness of EU structural funds on economic 
development where differences in regional levels of social capital exist. The role of social capital is 
critical when considering effectiveness of policy implementation because regions with higher levels 
of trust in government programmes are more receptive to implementation of new policy. Cappelen 
et al. (2003) is the only paper to note that a relationship between accompanying factors, such as a 
receptive environment, is likely to exist and impact the effectiveness of regional policies. However, 
they remain silent about what exactly these factors are. The remainder of this study emphasises the 
importance of social capital when explaining the effectiveness of regional policy to foster innovation 
and economic growth. 
 
3. Data description and strategy  
 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Regional and national data sets were available for the following twelve EU countries:  Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and the UK.  (Note:  Austria, Finland and Sweden were not taken into account due to insufficient 
data.)  The EU is divided into 83 regions based on the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics 
(NUTS). Regional divisions for each country were defined by NUTS1 for Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the UK, and by NUTS2 for Spain, Italy and 
Portugal.  Ireland and Greece lacked sufficient regional information of structural funds for regional 
assessment and were measured at the national level.   
 
3.1.1 Social capital 
Measures of social capital are not derived without controversy. The fundamental premise 
behind the value-added contributions of social capital is that it provides a forum where traditional 
resources (e.g., physical capital, human capital) can integrate with other resources (e.g., social 
networks, trust, norms and values) to produce better outcomes for individuals (e.g., Coleman, 1988). 
Indeed, from the economist’s point of view, the beneficial impacts arise only in cases where social 
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capital affects expectations.6 With this in mind, the following two indicators are used: (i) generalised 
trust (TRUST) and (ii) an index of social capital (SC). The data used to construct the measures of 
social capital are taken from the European Social Surveys (ESS):  a database designed to measure 
change and persistence of people’s social and demographic characteristics, attitudes, and values. The 
number of observations listed for each region in the ESS varies and is not always representative for 
the size and demographic structure of the region; therefore weights are applied to reduce the 
possibility of over sampling. 
Most studies that focus on the impacts of social capital on economic outcomes use generalised 
trust to measure the degree of opportunistic behaviour (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 
2001). Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1258) argue that trust “reflects the percentage of people in a 
society who expect that most others will act cooperatively in prisoner’s dilemma context”. Similarly, 
TRUST is constructed as the answer to the following questionnaire statement: “Most people can be 
trusted or you can’t be too careful”. The response category has 11 levels ranging from (0) “you can’t 
be too careful” to (10) “most people can be trusted”. The mean (standard deviation) of this variable 
for the EU-12 countries as a whole, equals 4.945 (2.395), n=25,268. 
The second indicator is an index of social capital that reflects different dimensions of social 
structure such as trust, solidarity, and organisational membership. There are two main reasons for 
constructing such an index. First, many indicators of social capital are highly correlated with each 
other, so analysing the effects of different dimensions at the same time (by placing more than two of 
the indicators in the same regression, for instance) generally does not produce sensible results 
because of collinearity problems.  Second, these variables are not only hypothesised to have 
individual impact on economic outcomes but may also reinforce each other. Five indicators have 
been integrated into one measure so that the several possible dimensions of social capital can be 
captured.  The subsequent social capital index (SC) is the average of the re-scaled values of the five 
indicators, specifically: SCj = ∑ = −
−m
j
ijij
ijij
XX
XX
1 )min()max(
)min(
, where Xij is the value of indicator i for 
region j and m is the number of indicators. The mean (standard deviation) of this social capital 
                                                 
6 Granovetter (1985), for example, puts stress on the networks of (social) relations in establishing expectations and in 
generating trust so to create and enforce norms. In a similar vein, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argue that social capital 
generates positive externalities, which are achieved through shared values, norms and trust that affect expectations and 
behaviour. Dasgupta (2003) discusses the importance of this latter argument in greater detail. 
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indicator equals 0.53 (0.10) for the whole sample. The correlation coefficient between TRUST and 
SC is 0.81 (n=83). 
Table 1 provides information and descriptive statistics concerning different social capital 
indicators. The first row depicts the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value of 
TRUST.  Of particular interest is the relatively large dispersion in generalised trust between the EU-
12 regions, with Spain having the lowest level (i.e., 1.66) and Denmark having the highest (i.e., 7.05). 
The next row depicts the social capital index which includes the following five indicators: TRUST, 
PPLHLP, PPLFAIR, IMPVO and VOLUN. These indicators incorporate the many aspects of social 
capital referred to in the literature. PPLHLP is an indicator which measures the extent to which 
people are helpful or altruistic vs. unhelpful or egoistic.  PPLFAIR measures a similar aspect with a 
slightly different focus on people being fair. This latter variable is on average higher, which could 
imply that on average people care relatively more for their own well-being and do not take advantage 
of others to a similar extent. Finally, IMPVO and VOLUN measure the attitude toward voluntary 
organisations and participation in voluntary organisations. Coupled with TRUST, these indicators are 
aggregated into the variable SC, which is applied to the empirical analysis as a measure of social 
capital. 
 
3.1.2 Structural funds 
EU structural funds are designed to target six objectives, four of which have a clear regional 
focus.7 The regional objectives are: economic adaptation of less developed regions (Objective 1); 
economic recovery of regions affected by the industrial crisis (Objective 2); speeding up adjustment 
of agricultural structures (Objective 5); and regions corresponding to or belonging to regions at 
NUTS2 level with a population density of eight inhabitants per squared kilometre or less (Objective 
6). Objectives 1, 2 and 5b are taken into account when conducting the empirical analysis.  Objective 
6 is left out because its coverage is limited to regions in the northern parts of Finland and Sweden 
where funding is less than 1 percent of the total money available making empirical analysis for all of 
the EU regions impossible. Objective 5a is also left out because it covers common agricultural 
policies which are not aimed specifically at the regional level. Objective 5b remains, as it is aimed 
specifically at rural and agricultural regions where low levels of socio-economic development, high 
shares of agricultural employment, and relatively low population density and/or a depopulation 
                                                 
7 The other two objectives involve reducing long-term unemployment (funding covers about 10 percent of the total 
available money) and facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial changes and to changes in production systems 
and technologies (about 2 percent of total funding). 
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trends exist. As of March 1999 over 85 percent of the overall budget is available for Objectives 1, 2 
and 5b.8 
Regional information is available for the period 1994-1999. The indicator used for the 
empirical analysis is the summation of structural funds for Objectives 1, 2 and 5b divided by regional 
GDP. Table 2 outlines a number of descriptive statistics for each of the EU-12 countries. The 
numbers reveal a variety of interesting trends regarding EU funds. EU structural funds as a 
percentage of GDP are increasing for all countries with the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, 
reaching a level of 3 percent of GDP in Portugal. In Greece and Portugal EU funds appear to be 
complemented by both private and public spending. This spending is defined as matching funds, 
which are a prerequisite for obtaining EU funding. In Greece especially, private funding increased 
almost fivefold over the 1990s. This tendency in Greece can also be seen for the other EU-12 
countries in terms of private expenditures. The share of EU funds is highly variable across the 
countries, with Spain, Portugal, and Greece, consuming more than half of the total structural funds, 
mainly in the form of Objective 1 support.  A more detailed analysis (not presented here) shows that 
there are significant differences between regions even within countries with relatively poor regions 
receiving a lot of Objective 1 support. For example in Germany, Baden-Wurttemberg received very 
little support (0.005 percent of GDP) when compared to Macklenburg-Worpemmern (1.3 percent of 
GDP). The level of EU funds is as high as 6 percent of GDP in the case of the Açores in Portugal. 
 
3.1.3 Economic performance 
Economic performance is measured using several indicators. All indicator data was sourced 
from the Eurostat REGIO database.9  GDP per capita dispersion from 1990 to 2002 is calculated 
based on Cappelen et al. (2003).10 In addition, information about Gross Value Added (GVA) is 
used.11 The resulting computations display a moderate form of catching-up especially after 1995 (e.g., 
the dispersion of GDP per capita drops from 0.160 in 1995 to 0.138 in 2002). This tendency towards 
convergence decreases when Greece, Spain, and Portugal are excluded from the sample. The GVA 
figures for the three main sectors in the economy depict a different picture. They indicate an 
increased level of divergence in the agricultural sector accompanied by relatively strong convergence 
in the industrial sector. On the other hand, the service sector displays the strongest level of 
                                                 
8 Authors’ own calculation from the available structural funds data at the country level. 
9 In addition, information available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat has been used as well.  
10 The per capita GDP dispersion figures are calculated by first computing the logs of regional GDP relative to EU 
averages for each year. The standard deviation of these numbers is used as a measure of dispersion. 
11 GVA is the net result of output valued at basic prices, minus intermediate consumption valued at purchasers’ prices, of 
a resident producer unit in a region. More information is available from the Eurostat webpage.
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convergence compared to the other two sectors over the same period. The main indicator for 
empirical analysis is the growth of per capita GDP between 1990 and 2002. 
 
3.1.4 Innovation 
The innovation data was sourced from the Eurostat REGIO database and the Eurostat 
database located on the Eurostat web pages. Expenditures for business R&D and government R&D 
are used as primary innovation indicators from the input side. R&D activity is measured by using the 
data on R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP for government and business sectors in 1995. 
Both R&D BUS and R&D GOV have a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 3.13 (East 
England) and 1.05 (Berlin), respectively. The mean (standard deviation) for R&D BUS is 0.67 (0.66) 
and 0.20 (0.20) for R&D GOV with n=83.  
A composite innovation index, constructed by taking both the input and output side indicators 
into account, was added to the study.  The innovation index (INNOV) is a version of the regional 
summary innovation index with different variables.12 The values for each indicator are re-scaled, 
summed, and then divided by the number of indicators as explained above for the social capital 
index. INNOV consists of an index of ten variables:13 (i) R&D personnel relative to the active 
population (i.e., education, government, and business sectors were applied separately as unique 
indicators); (ii) R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (i.e., education, government, and business 
sectors were applied separately as unique indicators); (iii) human resources in science and technology 
(i.e., total, per population); (iv) EPO patent applications relative to the region’s labour force; (v) 
employment in high-technology manufacturing (i.e., as a percentage of total employment); and (vi) 
employment in high-technology knowledge intensive services (i.e., as a percentage of total 
employment). INNOV has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.258 (0.130). The minimum value of 
INNOV is 0.046 (Valle d’Aosta, Italy) and the maximum is 0.647 (Baden Wurttemberg, Germany). 
Several indices using different variables were constructed to check the robustness of the innovation 
indicator. The correlation between them ranges from 0.94 to 0.99, adding confidence to the validity 
of the innovation measure.14  
                                                 
12 For details see European Innovation Scoreboard 2003-Indicators methodological report, available at 
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/scoreboards/scoreboard2003/scoreboard_papers.cfm.  
13 The innovation data are for 1995 except for the patent data. The selection of 1995 is due to data availability. Patent 
data are the average of 1990, 1991 and 1992 number of patent applications. 
14 Composite indices with different indicators may render different results; therefore we constructed several innovation 
indices by omitting and including different indicators. As mentioned above the correlations between the indices are high. 
Moreover, all of the indices behave similarly in the regression analysis (i.e., all the indices produce significant coefficients, 
at least at the 10% significance level, when included in the regression).    
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Patent data is used to proxy innovation output so that the determinants of innovative output 
can be assessed. More specifically, patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) by year 
of filing per inhabitant (or per labour force) are used in the regression analysis below.  Patent data 
contained in the Eurostat database refers only to patent applications made to the EPO and does not 
include data associated with patent applications made to the National Patent Offices in Europe. 
Therefore, the figures associated with this data may not reflect the true regional potential for 
innovation. Following Furman et al. (2002), this measure nevertheless reflects “commercially 
significant innovations at the world’s technological frontier”. Keeping in mind that patent data may 
not be a perfect indicator for the innovative performance of a region (e.g., Pavitt, 1982, 1988), it 
remains to be the only well-established source of data that reflects inventive activity (Trajtenberg, 
1990). Patent applications display a trend of catching up revealed by a correlation coefficient of -0.54 
between the growth of patents in the 1991-2000 period and the initial level of patent applications.  A 
second innovation index, only including the innovation input indicators, has been computed as well. 
INNOV_input is based on four indicators; (i) R&D personnel relative to the active population (total); 
(ii) business R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP; (iii) employment in high-technology 
manufacturing (i.e., as a percentage of total employment); (iv) employment in high-technology 
knowledge intensive services (i.e., as a percentage of total employment). 
 
3.2 Empirical implementation 
 
Two sets of equations were estimated to show that indicators of social capital are causal to 
economic outcomes. One equation was used to determine the effect social capital has on economic 
growth for the period 1990-2002 and the other was used to determine the effect social capital has on 
patent growth for the period 1991- 2000. The difficulty associated with reverse causation is that there 
remains an inherent fundamental problem when estimating these relationships, primarily due to the 
fact that current levels of social capital are likely to be influenced by past and current economic 
conditions. Simple OLS estimates depicting the relationship between social capital and economic 
outcomes might be biased; therefore they cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of social capital on 
economic growth and innovation. Problems associated with this bias were solved by using a 2SLS 
strategy where indicators of past political institutions between the 17th and 19th centuries were used as 
instruments for social capital. These instruments are similar to those used by Tabellini (2005) in his 
study on the causal effect of culture on income. 
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Tabellini (2005) argues that it is highly probable that the formal institutions that belong to a 
region’s historical past shape its current cultural state.  This becomes even more apparent when one 
considers that there were EU regions located within the same country that were governed by 
different political institutions and powers, especially before the 19th century. His estimates show that 
political liberalism has a positive impact as it shapes “good” cultural character, whereas past rigid 
autocratic political power may have had a negative impact resulting in “bad” cultural character.  In 
order to capture the impacts associated with past political institutions, we refer to Acemoglu et al. 
(2005) and to a greater degree, Tabellini (2005), by using ‘constraints on the executive’ as a proxy to 
historical political institutions as defined in the POLITY IV project.15 This variable is meant to 
capture “institutionalised constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives”. It is coded 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents “unlimited authority” and 7 represents “accountable 
executive constrained by checks and balances”. Information is available for the following five dates: 
1600, 1700, 1750, 1800, and 1850. The main data source for this variable is Tabellini (2005). In cases 
where data was missing, observations for some of the regions and countries were sourced from the 
POLITY IV data set located on the POLITY IV project webpage. The appendix in Akçomak and ter 
Weel (2006) shows in detail how these variables are constructed.  
The following equations were estimated for a set of 83 EU regions: 
 
 
GDP 1990−2002   =     C + α1 GDP1990 + α2SC + α3EUFUND + α4X 
α5EDUC + α6INT1 + α7INT2 + ε    (1) 
 
PAT 1990−2002   =      C + β1 PAT1990 + β2SC + β3EUFUND + β4X 
β5EDUC + β6INT1 + β7INT2 + ν    (2) 
 
 
where the subscript r for regions has been suppressed for notational convenience, and where ε and ν 
are error terms with the usual assumptions. GDP 1990−2002 is the average annual GDP per capita 
growth in the period 1990-2002 and PAT 1991−2000 is the average annual change in patent applications 
per head for the period 1991-2000. GDP1990 and PAT1991 are included as measures of convergence. 
SC is either trust or the social capital index as defined above, and EUFUND is the total structural 
funds as a percentage of GDP. The variables INT1 and INT2 denote interaction terms. INT1 is the 
                                                 
15 For more information about the variable and the POLITY IV data set see the POLITY IV project webpage 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. Tabellini (2005) provides a thorough historical appendix about the political 
state of EU regions between 17th and 19th centuries. 
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interaction between education and social capital, which are expected to reinforce one another. INT2 
is the interaction between measures of education, social capital, and EU funding. This interaction 
term captures complementary relationships that may exist between social capital and EU funding. 
Depending on the equation estimated, X denotes a vector of other variables. For the per capita GDP 
growth these are:  share of employment in industry and agriculture sectors in 1990; education, as 
measured by the share of upper secondary students in total students as defined by ISCED97 for 
1993; innovation indicators such as R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP for business and 
public sectors; and the composite innovation index. The patent growth model does not include 
employment variables, and the share of students in tertiary education replaces the education variable 
since it is more plausible to hypothesize higher education as a proxy to represent education in a 
patent growth regression. INNOV_input also substitutes the innovation index. 
 
4. Results 
 
This section discusses the results of estimating equations (1) and (2). Second-stage regression 
results of the 2SLS estimates are presented (first-stage results are available upon request). As 
expected, first-stage estimates generally depict a strong and positive relationship between the 
instruments and the measures of social capital. The first row of each table indicates whether the 
estimates are OLS or 2SLS. The standard errors reported in all tables of the paper have been 
adjusted for clustering. In addition, F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments always exceed 
the critical value of 10, as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).  This adds confidence to the validity 
of the instruments by removing problems associated with weak instruments. Finally, the null-
hypothesis that the over-identifiying restrictions are valid is never rejected.  
 
4.1 Economic growth 
 
Estimates of equation (1) using different sets of independent variables are presented in Table 3.  
Average annual regional GDP per capita growth for the period 1990-2002 is explained in column (1)  
by GDP in 1990, shares of employment, business R&D activities, the region’s share of students in 
upper secondary education, trust, and EU funding. In addition, an interaction term between 
education and trust is included to show the complementary relationship between the two, as outlined 
in Section 2.  The estimates reveal convergence among the EU-12 regions reflected by a negative 
effect of initial GDP per capita on economic growth in the subsequent period. Furthermore, a higher 
share of agricultural employment is likely to result as a detriment to economic growth. The indicators 
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of innovation, social capital, government support, and education do not appear to have a significant 
correlation to growth during this period. It is interesting to note that the interaction between 
education and trust is positive and significant, pointing out the complementarity between the two. 
The results presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 show the effects that occur when the 
interaction between structural funds, education, and trust is added. This interaction term always 
significantly contributes to economic growth and it depicts the independent effect of trust on 
economic outcomes in the EU regions. Similar results are obtained when the social capital index SC 
replaces TRUST. These OLS estimates are reported in column (4). 
Since problems associated with reversed causality between measures of social capital and 
economic growth are serious, a 2SLS strategy where the social capital variables are instrumented by 
the historical information on institutions is applied to present the same type of analysis.  These 
results are listed in columns (5) to (8) of Table 3. The estimates presented in column (5) and (6) are 
the 2SLS equivalent of the OLS estimates presented in column (3) and (4) respectively.  What is most 
interesting to observe is that instrumenting social capital increases the coefficients on TRUST and 
SC considerably suggesting a strong link from social capital to economic growth. The interaction 
effects also become more powerful and significant. In addition, the effect that R&D has on 
economic growth is positive and significant, likely because the 2SLS approach removes measurement 
error from the social capital variables.  The results presented in columns (7) and (8) replace the 
business R&D variable by an indicator of public R&D (R&D GOV). This is done because there 
might be cases where regions with more social capital not only benefit from policy initiatives that 
foster development, such as the EU funds, but also benefit from their ability to gain from public 
spending on innovation. Indeed, the estimates presented in columns (7) and (8) for TRUST and SC 
respectively, suggest that government R&D significantly contributes to economic growth. The 
effects of social capital and EU funding on growth remain similar to the results presented for 
business R&D investments.  
To further investigate the importance of innovation, the variable INNOV replaced R&D 
indicators resulting in the estimates presented in the final four columns of Table 3.  The advantage of 
INNOV is that it captures both input and output characteristics of innovation. The results of this 
exercise suggest that innovation contributes to growth in a significant way and that when combined, 
social capital and EU funding also contribute positively to development throughout the 1990s. 
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A sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine the robustness of the estimates. This analysis 
was designed to examine the responsiveness of TRUST.16 The methodology basically involves 
assessing the “fragility” of TRUST with respect to additional independent variables that have the 
potential to reflect the cultural characteristics of a region and, as such, explain GDP growth. The first 
step is to estimate a GDP growth model. This model includes initial GDP, the share of agricultural 
and industrial employment, the composite innovation index, education, trust, interaction terms, and 
the set of 12 country dummies. Then we determined the number of switch variables that are not only 
exogenous to TRUST, but also have a low correlation with each other avoiding any problems 
associated with multicollinearity. Fifteen switch variables were introduced to the base model in 
groups of one to three variables at a time. This exercise resulted in 575 regression estimations. The 
results show that the relationship between TRUST and per capita GDP growth is robust with respect 
to inclusion of other relevant variables. TRUST has a mean coefficient of 0.027 with a confidence 
interval of [0.025 to 0.029]. More than 85 percent of the estimated coefficients of TRUST are 
significant at least at the 10 percent level. The only noteworthy effect of switch variables on growth 
were those related to religion (i.e., belonging to a certain religion). 
 When combined, these results suggest that EU funding did not have a direct effect on 
economic performance during the 1990s. This finding corroborates earlier evidence presented by 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) which suggest that monies already spent do not make a positive 
contribution to the economic development of relatively backward regions. That said, it is important 
to note that the main finding of this analysis is that in order for EU policy to be effective, social 
capital must be present.  Given a certain level of economic development, regions with higher levels 
of social capital benefit more from EU funding than regions with lower levels of social capital. 
 
4.2 Innovation 
 
The estimation results of equation (2) are presented in Table 4. The table shows only the 
second-stage results of the 2SLS estimations. The dependent variable is defined as the number of 
patent applications per million inhabitants. Results using the number of patent applications relative 
to a region’s labour force yield similar qualitative results. 
                                                 
16 The methodology used is carried out using the MetaGrowth computer programme employed in Beugelsdijk et al. 
(2004) and provided by Henri de Groot. The software is designed specifically to assess the robustness of estimating 
models of cross-country/region empirical analyses. For details about the programme see Heijungs et al. (2001). 
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The table is divided into two sets of results. The first four columns list estimates including 
those related to business R&D, and the second set of columns reports estimates that used INNOV 
input as an indicator for technology related activities.17 The estimates suggest a positive role for 
TRUST and SC in explaining changes in innovation output, which stresses the importance of these 
variables for carrying out successful research projects. If the level of social capital is high, then there 
will likely be a decrease in the number of information frictions that occur between the capitalists (i.e., 
those who finance the innovation project) and the entrepreneurs (i.e., those who implement the 
project). Higher levels of trust between these parties will work to increase penalties to those who 
continue to cheat investors, so that any further damage to reputation can be avoided.  It is more 
likely that there will be less cheating and more (venture) capitalist project investment in regions 
where higher levels of trust and social norms occur.  
This exercise also suggests that there is a direct negative effect of EU funding on innovation 
output. This is partly due to the fact that many of the funded regions are backward and as such, are 
not doing much in terms of innovation as is reflected in the number of patents.  In these cases it 
appears that an increase in funding does not benefit innovation. This direct estimate supports the 
doubts many academics and policy makers have had during their pursuit for effective regional policy 
that fosters development. That said, it appears that a complementary relationship between social 
capital and policy effectiveness exists due to the strength and significance of the effects associated 
with the interaction between social capital and EU funding.  Interpretation of these results supports 
the fact that certain levels of trust must be present to carry out innovation.  If trust is high, then 
more funds will be devoted to innovation.  As trust increases, problems associated with information 
decrease and as such, prescribed funding is spent more appropriately.  This also holds true for EU 
funding which is spent more effectively when information problems are reduced, improving the 
potential for innovation and growth. 
Finally, the sensitivity analysis of TRUST in the patent growth regression model suggests 
similar findings to those found in the case of GDP per capita growth. The OLS version of model (6), 
Table 4, is used as the base model.  Twelve switch variables were selected to assess the robustness of 
the estimates presented in Table 4. A total of 298 regression equations were estimated to determine 
robustness. Our findings suggest that a robust relationship between TRUST and patent growth 
exists. The analysis produced a mean coefficient of 0.117 ranging from 0.108 to 0.126. Over 80 
                                                 
17 Estimates for government R&D suggest similar outcomes. These results are available upon request. 
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percent of the estimated coefficients of TRUST are significant at least at the 10 percent level. Two of 
the twelve switch variables are worth mentioning when explaining patent growth: they include (i) 
indicators measuring different aspects of the importance of obeying laws and (ii) regulations. This 
would appear to make sense, since patent protection and intellectual property rights are known to be 
important for innovation output growth. 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
 
This section discusses three ways in which the implications associated with the estimation 
results impact innovation.  First, policy implications associated with the results are discussed with a 
focus on education policy, EU support programme effectiveness, institutional design, and 
establishment. Second, the case of Italy is presented as an illustration of social capital working within 
a country to make a difference in its economic outcomes, further stressing the importance to 
stimulate the creation of social capital. Finally, there is a brief summary of the main findings followed 
by a discussion of the potential for wider application of the estimates. 
 
5.1 Policy implications for innovation 
 
5.1.1 Education 
What does the future hold for education in Europe? The estimates in this chapter have shown 
the positive effects education has had on economic outcomes. It is important to note that the 
educational variable was not split up into different educational categories.  This was intentional for 
two reasons:  first, data availability limited the number of regions that had sufficient information for 
each of the specific fields of education; second, from a theoretical and empirical point of view, 
specific fields of education are not considered critical for the formation of social capital. Recall that 
the effects of education interact directly with social capital, and that previous work indicated that the 
level of education is more important than the field. The policy perspective for education is simple: an 
increase in the levels of education in backward regions will increase norms and values, bonds, and 
connectivity in the form of networks, which will in turn increase the level of social capital. Policy 
makers should make this their primary goal given the fact that a relatively large dispersion in 
educational levels exists. 
A second effect associated with an increase in the levels of education is that it serves as input 
into the process of innovation. Perhaps in this case, a focus on technical ability coupled with an 
increased inflow into technical studies would help to increase innovation efforts. On the other hand, 
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past examples of specific labour-market policies which aim to make labour flow towards innovation 
have not been very effective. This is primarily due to the fact that when labour flows from one sector 
to another the associated supply and demand must be adjusted to yield different prices. Goolsbee 
(1998) has shown that an increase in the wages for scientists and engineers in innovative sectors 
results in a flow of workers towards these sectors and a labour shortage in the sectors where these 
workers were originally employed. This increases the overall level of wages for these occupations 
thereby rendering only a price effect. A better approach would be to stimulate education in specific 
fields of study. 
 
5.1.2 EU programme effectiveness 
What does the future hold for programmes in Europe? The debate surrounding EU funding 
effectivity is complicated because it has been going on for a long period of time and because it is 
difficult to assess empirically.  From an econometric point of view it is difficult to distinguish cause 
and effect and to address the effectivity of exogenous variation which is required to estimate EU 
funding contributions to economic development. From a more practical point of view the 
correlations presented in this research suggest that the EU policies are ineffective in their direct 
contribution to innovation and development, but effective in combination with social capital. The 
policy implication of this strong and significant result is that the Objective 1, 2 and 5b EU 
programmes should come with an appropriate amount of education and dissemination of 
information in the regions at stake. While a provision of education from specific fields would be 
advantageous to a region, an increase of the overall level of education within a region would likely 
provide a better situation having both direct and indirect effects on economic outcomes. Increasing 
levels of social capital is only possible if problems associated with information are solved. Policies 
targeted at solving such issues should take into account the length of time it takes to establish trust, 
and perhaps more importantly, should ensure that the right design of institution is established.   
 
5.1.3 Institutions 
What institutions should Europe develop in the future? While social capital is useful when 
explaining potential economic outcomes, it is difficult to transform social capital into formal 
institutions. Traditional approaches that were implemented to increase innovation and growth 
include the establishment of intellectual property rights protection, courts of justice, and law.  While 
there is no question that these institutions help increase the potential for innovation and growth, it 
remains unclear how they interact with social capital. Generally speaking, these institutions work to 
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increase the probability that start-up firms will be established and will innovate and produce with 
great success.  However, if a situation occurs where the people of a region have little or no trust in 
the government, then the institutional framework will be perceived as a detriment to innovation and 
growth.  Currently, Europe has a sound and homogenous institutional framework but a considerable 
level of heterogeneity in terms of social capital throughout all of its regions. The fight against 
corruption and opportunism should be realized so that increased levels of social capital coupled with 
strong institutional frameworks can serve as an engine to growth and innovation. 
Provision for venture capital is primarily based on trust between the innovator and the 
capitalist. The provision of venture capital by the market is more effective if the capitalist is 
protected from corruption and if incentives are such that the innovator is punished when he defaults. 
In addition, the expenditure of government monies must be held accountable by providing detailed 
follow-up reports outlining the results and merits of the expenditure, to promote confidence in the 
EU governing bodies and effectiveness of their associated policies.  This can only be accomplished 
by supporting a cooperative and transparent exchange of information throughout the entire process.  
The current growth and extension of the EU into other countries provides an excellent opportunity 
to improve the exchange of information by revising the monitoring and information system in 
Brussels. Decentralised funding from investors who are trusted by the public and support for 
improved access to information at “the construction site”, are likely to boost confidence in both the 
EU and local government authorities. 
 
 
5.2 Italy 
 
Italy is one of the more prominent examples of a country where society is stratified along the 
lines of income, development, and crime:  the rich and trustworthy north, and the poor and corrupt 
south. Putnam (1993) based his study of social capital on Italy, and Guiso et al. (2004) based their 
study on the differences between regional patterns of economic development and social cohesion in 
Italy, with an emphasis on the split between the northern and southern regions. 
Table 5 lists a number of core variables associated with the empirical analysis.  Note that all 
numbers in the table are standardized means, so that the average of the 83 regions’ indicators found 
in the sample is equal to zero.  The first two rows depict the discrepancy between the measures of 
social capital found in the north and south. The next two rows similarly depict a huge difference in 
the levels of education found in the north and south.  Taken together, these four indicators imply 
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that development in the southern areas of Italy should be far less than the economic development in 
the northern areas.  An examination of the GDP indicators and innovation measures determines that 
this is certainly the case. 
Now, what should Italy’s policy look like in the future?  First and foremost, policy should focus 
on increasing levels of education so that an increase in the level of social capital might be realized to 
increase innovation and output.  Note that Italy had the greatest regional difference in levels of 
education (i.e., between its northern and southern regions) for all EU countries in our data.  A 
secondary effect associated with increasing levels of education is that it provides a means for people 
to make a living on their own so that they might escape involvement with illegal acts and crime. Final 
observations indicate that social capital in southern Italy is almost non-existent. This implies that the 
theoretically detrimental effects of social capital on society should be absent. Social capital and bonds 
can be high within the gang structure, but levels of trust for society as a whole will be exceptionally 
low. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
The estimates discussed in this paper suggest that a positive correlation between social capital 
and government support programmes designed to foster economic development and economic 
outcomes exists. There appears to be a greater capacity to implement government support 
programmes in specific regions where higher levels of social capital exist. As such, the region 
benefits in terms of higher levels of economic growth and increased innovative activity. The 
empirical analysis indicates that there is an interplay between social capital and government 
investments in the EU regions. This is an important finding as it suggests that norms and values that 
have not been institutionalised by property rights or integrated into other legal institutions, play a 
critical role in the effective implementation of support programmes. As such the EU Objective 1, 2 
and 5b programmes for EU regional support do not appear to foster economic development on 
their own but when combined with higher levels of social capital, they benefit both economic 
development and innovation. 
One of the main advantages of this study is that it has used information from a set of relatively 
homogeneous countries and/or regions, which decreases the influence of other (unobserved) factors 
on the estimates. While it would be premature to draw firm conclusions for other countries or 
regions based on these estimates, it is likely that these estimates suggest that a certain level of social 
capital is necessary for successful implementation of government support.  Indeed, case study 
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evidence from Kenya suggests that if social capital cannot be created in the short term it can be in 
the long term by spending monies to foster education so that there is an increase in the levels of trust 
and participation in groups, which in turn will increase levels of social capital (Gugerty and Kremer, 
2002). In addition, fostering investment in human capital appears to be an effective way in which 
levels of social capital might be increased.  Aside from the direct impact of human capital on 
economic performance and its role as an input into the process of innovation and human capital’s 
indirect approach to the promotion of social cohesion and compliance with norms and values is an 
effect that should not be overlooked.  At this point in time there is a difference between the average 
levels of education of about 8.2 years between the most advanced regions of the EU (i.e., located 
mostly in the northern parts of the EU) and the least advanced regions of the EU (i.e., located 
mostly in the southern areas of the EU). It would appear the EU’s capacity to support future 
development would be improved greatly if this education gap was closed.  This of course, would 
require a commitment to invest in resources to support education.  Human capital must be viewed as 
an investment good that requires effective policy programs to support skills acquisition from an early 
age onward.  Investment in schools and training, coupled with a campaign to promote awareness of 
the importance of education within the family unit, will foster technological progress and human 
capital as a whole.   
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Table 1 
The measurement of social capital 
Variable  Description Mean (st. dev.) Min Max
TRUST Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too 
careful. Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS. Higher number 
representing higher trust. 
4.78 (0.69) 1.66 7.05
SC Index of social capital constructed by using the five 
variables below.  
0.53 (0.10) 0.13 0.76
PPLHLP Most of the time people are helpful or mostly 
looking out for themselves. Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS, 
10: most people are helpful.  
4.59 (0.74) 1.52 6.14
PPLFAIR Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to 
be fair. Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS, 10: most people try 
to be fair. 
5.37 (0.75) 2.20 7.36
IMPVO Important in life: voluntary organizations Coded as 0 
to 10 in ESS. Higher numbers representing higher 
importance. 
5.04 (1.18) 2.91 7.45
VOLUN Index constructed from ESS measuring the 
involvement of the respondents in active voluntary 
work for different organizations.  
0.02 (0.01) 0.00 0.06
Note: The number of regions equals 83. Further information is provided in Section 3.1.1. 
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Table 2 
EU support as a percentage of GDP 
 1994-1999 1989-1993 
  Total SF Nat. Exp. Priv. Exp. Total SF Nat. Exp. Priv. Exp.
Belgium 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.09 0.13 0.06
Denmark 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
Germany 0.18 0.17 0.35 0.09 0.14 0.12
Greece 2.76 1.25 1.44 2.40 1.35 0.29
Spain 1.37 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.55 0.25
France 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.08
Ireland 1.74 0.65 0.61 2.38 1.52 1.48
Italy 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.10
Luxembourg 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.25
Netherlands 0.11 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.04
Portugal 3.10 1.22 1.24 2.82 1.62 1.28
UK 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.05
EU average. 0.64 0.36 0.47 0.48 0.36 0.28
Note: “Total SF” is the total structural funds as percentage of GDP received by a country. “Nat. Exp.” and “Priv. Exp.” stand for 
the national public and private sector expenditures, respectively that matches structural funds.     
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Table 3 
Growth in EU Regions: Growth of per capita GDP 1990-2002 
 
GROWTH 1990-2002 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 
INITIAL GDP -0.461 -0.445 -0.415 -0.486 -0.471 -0.585 -0.440 -0.563 -0.433 -0.500 -0.494 -0.587 
  (0.097)*** (0.095)*** (0.098)*** (0.102)*** (0.077)*** (0.118)*** (0.062)*** (0.112)*** (0.085)*** (0.088)*** (0.067)*** (0.099)*** 
AGREMP  -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
  (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
INDEMP  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D BUS  0.026 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027       
  (0.015) (0.014)* (0.013)** (0.013)* (0.015)* (0.013)*       
TRUST  0.014 0.037 0.026  0.078  0.078  0.024  0.081  
  (0.015) (0.012)*** (0.014)*  (0.017)***  (0.011)***  (0.010)**  (0.024)***  
EU FUND 0.015 0.061 0.070 0.027 0.066 0.004 0.066 0.006 0.080 0.039 0.075 0.018 
  (0.038) (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.053) (0.028) (0.049) (0.024) (0.036)** (0.031) (0.051) (0.019) 
EDU_second 0.030 0.049 0.046 0.031 0.060 0.026 0.059 0.027 0.054 0.040 0.069 0.035 
  (0.041) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.043) (0.024)** (0.023) (0.033)* (0.032) 
SC     0.029  0.103  0.114  0.024  0.092 
     (0.011)**  (0.029)***  (0.039)**  (0.009)**  (0.019)*** 
R&D GOV       0.028 0.025     
        (0.012)** (0.011)*     
INNOV          0.061 0.061 0.058 0.056 
          (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)** (0.014)*** 
EDU*TRUST 0.022  0.020  -0.011  -0.009  0.023  -0.011  
  (0.012)*  (0.010)*  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.010)**  (0.031)  
EUF*EDU*TRUST  0.064 0.062  0.087  0.081  0.061  0.090  
   (0.030)* (0.030)*  (0.042)*  (0.037)*  (0.026)**  (0.039)**  
EDU*SC     0.000  -0.037  -0.039  0.007  -0.027 
     (0.007)  (0.023)  (0.020)*  (0.010)  (0.021) 
EUF*EDU*SC    0.025  0.049  0.052  0.025  0.046 
     (0.010)**  (0.013)***  (0.016)**  (0.007)***  (0.012)*** 
CONSTANT 5.052 4.887 4.559 5.362 4.954 6.419 4.601 6.164 4.671 5.434 5.089 6.086 
  (0.883)*** (0.878)*** (0.919)*** (1.023)*** (0.861)*** (1.160)*** (0.662)*** (1.108)*** (0.790)*** (0.857)*** (0.706)*** (0.958)*** 
 
N  83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
ADJ R2   0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.85 0.80 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.85 
OVERID      4.26(0.37) 4.39(0.36) 5.03(0.28) 3.89(0.42)   3.58(0.47) 4.90(0.30)  
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust in the sense that we allow arbitrary correlations within countries. To assess whether instruments are jointly significant in 
the first stage we performed F-tests. The F-tests are significant for all the models at the 1 % level and the values range from 21.57 to 61.77. OVERID stands for Sargan 
over identification test. The numbers in parentheses are the p-values [χ2(4)] associated with each model. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% 
level, and * is significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 
Growth of patent applications 1991-2000: Results of 2SLS estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
INITIAL PAT.  -0.527 -0.681 -0.536 -0.642 -0.552 -0.727 -0.557 -0.695 
  (0.127)*** (0.136)*** (0.123)*** (0.139)*** (0.136)*** (0.129)*** (0.119)*** (0.132)*** 
EDU_higher 0.105 0.163 0.103 0.124 0.091 0.150 0.090 0.113 
  (0.035)** (0.046)*** (0.029)*** (0.038)*** (0.028)*** (0.035)*** (0.025)*** (0.034)*** 
EU FUND -0.333 -0.885 -0.328 -0.653 -0.323 -0.899 -0.321 -0.716 
  (0.109)** (0.197)*** (0.099)*** (0.178)*** (0.113)** (0.174)*** (0.108)** (0.195)*** 
R&D BUS  0.161 0.174 0.141 0.164     
  (0.075)* (0.075)** (0.069)* (0.078)*     
INNOV_input     1.344 1.611 1.147 1.420 
      (0.603)* (0.499)*** (0.497)** (0.589)** 
TRUST  0.114 0.305   0.109 0.308   
  (0.093) (0.113)**   (0.084) (0.096)***   
SC    0.228 0.297   0.225 0.314 
    (0.134) (0.134)*   (0.136) (0.129)** 
EDU*TRUST 0.120 0.188   0.111 0.180   
  (0.031)*** (0.020)***   (0.026)*** (0.027)***   
EUF*EDU*TRUST  0.550    0.578   
   (0.119)***    (0.108)***   
EDU*SC    0.122 0.151   0.114 0.149 
    (0.012)*** (0.022)***   (0.015)*** (0.028)*** 
EUF*EDU*SC    0.203    0.247 
     (0.078)**    (0.087)** 
CONSTANT 2.123 5.130 2.800 2.317 2.235 5.030 1.851 4.357 
  (0.243)*** (0.900)*** (0.399)*** (0.325)*** (0.306)*** (0.756)*** (0.189)*** (0.673)*** 
 
N  83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Adjusted R-sqr 0.52 0.61 0.48 0.45 0.54 0.64 0.49 0.46 
OVERID  0.14(0.93) 0.82(0.66) 0.44(0.80) 1.01(0.61) 0.27(0.87) 1.48(0.48) 0.45(0.80) 1.35(0.51) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust in the sense that we allow arbitrary correlations within countries. To assess whether instruments are jointly significant in 
the first stage we performed F-tests. The F-tests are significant at 1% level for all the models and the values range from 34.41 to 72.95. OVERID stands for Sargan 
over identification test. The numbers in parentheses are the p-values [χ2(4)] associated with each model. *** *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% 
level, and * is significant at the 10% level.           
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Table 5 
The case of Italy 
 
 North Italy South Italy Italy
TRUST 0.321 -1.000 -0.246
Composite social capital index (SC) 0.208 -0.947 -0.339
Share of students in upper secondary level, 1993 0.648 0.292 0.488
Share of students in tertiary level, 1993 0.838 -0.125 0.405
Composite innovation index (INNOV) -0.318 -0.591 -0.447
Total R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.383 -0.585 -0.479
Business R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.295 -0.725 -0.499
Government R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.365 -0.037 -0.210
Patent application per population, 1995 0.098 -0.686 -0.274
Gross value added, total, 1995 0.396 -0.746 -0.093
Gross value added, agriculture, 1995 0.063 0.060 0.062
Gross value added, industry, 1995 0.471 -1.011 -0.164
Gross value added, services, 1995 0.328 -0.534 -0.042
Total EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP -0.503 -0.007 -0.280
Objective 1 EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP -0.505 0.045 -0.258
Objective 2 EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP 0.174 -0.650 -0.197
Objective 5B EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP 0.146 -0.413 -0.106
Note: All values are standardized meaning that a value of 0 equals the mean of the sample n=83. 
North Italy: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trento, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Emila-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche. 
South Italy: Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna. 
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